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12 DAVID ZETLAND
1. Problem Definition
You have just exited Interstate 80 and are headed to downtown
Davis. You have to stop, however, for a red light at the \worst" in-
tersection in Davis. You wait as the green light blesses one direction
at a time. Don't you hate waiting? Drivers waiting at the other two
red lights hate it too. Bikes hate this intersection because they cannot
make a right turn to go under the railroad tracks and must go straight.
They get hit by cars, whose drivers are worried about bicyclists and
other drivers trying to make a turn before they get caught behind that
light for a minute and forty-¯ve seconds.
In this analysis, I will examine tra±c control
1 alternatives that can
improve situations like this using at two intersections in Davis as exam-
ples. My primary alternative is the roundabout design, which lowers
top speeds, increases average speeds, and results in safer and more sat-
isfying tra±c °ow for drivers, bicyclists, pedestrians and neighborhood
residents.
1.1. Summary De¯nition. Inappropriate tra±c control methods re-
sulting from planning inertia leads to ine±cient, less safe, and unsatis-
factory transport experiences for residents and commuters in Davis.
1.2. Detail. While most of us are not going to experience an accident
in Davis, all of us will use the streets to move around the city. This
1A tra±c-control system \is to promote highway safety, e±ciency, and uniformity
so that tra±c can move e±ciently on the Nation's streets and highways," says the
Federal Highway Administration (http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/kno-faq.htm).ROUNDABOUTS IN DAVIS 3
Figure 1. An Urban Single-Lane Roundabout has an
inscribed circle diameter of 30-40 meters, allows a 35 kmh
entry speed and 20,000 vehicles per day. The busiest
Davis intersections have about 25,000 vehicles per day
(PWD, 2005).
experience can be frustrating when the rules appear to be \out of sync"
with the needs of commuters (pedestrians, bicyclists and motorists).
Rules, which are most obvious at intersections, slow us down, let others
go too fast or just get in the way to a satisfactory experience. One often
neglected aspect to ill-formed rules is their impact on non-commuters,
i.e., the people who are living in areas with tra±c circulation.
This analysis will consider how roundabouts can improve the experi-
ence of commuters and non-commuters alike. See Figure 1 for a typical
example of a roundabout.4 DAVID ZETLAND
1.3. Evidence of a Problem. Since government is in charge of this
public good (roads), inadequate provision of road services is a govern-
ment failure that needs attention. The evidence of a problem with
respect to tra±c circulation is both quantitative and qualitative. In-
e±cient tra±c circulation (measured by delay or variation in speeds
at intersections) and accidents can be measured qualitatively. Driver
frustration, pedestrian and bicyclist reports of \perceived security,"
and neighborhood satisfaction with tra±c are all qualitative measures.
While I do not have data of either type,
2 there is frustration with
tra±c circulation in Davis|especially at intersections similar to those
in this study.
3 Since this analysis is counterfactual, I will use data
from roundabouts in other locations to show what quantitative changes
might occur and general reasoning to support potential qualitative im-
provements.
I evaluate two intersections: Richards Boulevard at Olive Drive (Fig-
ures 2 and 3) and A Street at 3rd Street (Figures 4 and 5). At each
location, I will describe the current situation, what could be improved
and the feasibility of an improvement. I choose the ¯rst intersection
because it is \the worst" and the second because bicycles and cars are
in constant con°ict. Table 1 gives accident statistics for Richards at
2I have personal experience and anecdotal evidence to draw on here. (See e.g.,
Talevich et al. (2005)).
3There are numerous other intersections that I could have chosen; instead I use two
examples to \prove" the concept.ROUNDABOUTS IN DAVIS 5
Figure 2. Richards Boulevard at Olive Drive, \the
worst intersection in Davis" due to left-turn delays, mis-
matched speeds of drivers exiting the freeway and leaving
the residential areas, and heavy bicycle tra±c (Talevich
et al., 2005).
Table 1. Richards Blvd/Olive Drive accident statistics
for ¯ve years (2000-2004) 18 of 43 were injury accidents,
5 of which invloved bicyclists (\other") (DPD, 2005).
2000-4 Annual Average
Rear-Ender 25 5
Broadside/Head-on 8 1.6
Other 10 2
Olive from 2000-2004 data. Table 2 gives tra±c °ow statistics for each
intersection.4
4(A)ADT means \(Annual) Average Daily Tra±c." This information will be useful
when comparing quantitative di®erences between alternatives.6 DAVID ZETLAND
Figure 3. View from Olive, west of Richards, looking
east. Downtown Davis is to the left. I-80 is to the right.
Table 2. Average Daily Tra±c (ADT) volumes at sub-
ject intersections (PWD, 2005).
Street Date ADT
Richards Blvd S/O 1st St 4/12/2004 23264
Olive Dr @ 1280 Olive Dr 2/10/2004 2907
A St N/O 3rd St 10/3/2000 3250
1.4. Underlying Causes. Economists have concluded from observa-
tion that people prefer the average to the extreme. This concept is most
often used in risk analysis|where a \risk-averse" individual prefers to
have the average jackpot without risk rather than gamble until win-
ning the average jackpot in a series of wins and losses (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). With tra±c °ow, the implication is that commutersROUNDABOUTS IN DAVIS 7
Figure 4. A Street at 3rd Street, where heavy east-
west bike tra±c to and from the Davis campus crosses
the northbound one-way street at an intersection with
three often ignored stop signs.
prefer to go at a steady speed rather than speed up and slow down
around that steady speed.5 For similar reasons, non-commuters prefer
that cars have a low variation in speeds so that they are more pre-
dictable when traveling through the neighborhood. By design, tra±c
signals and stop signs increase variation and create discomfort. This
discomfort grows in intensity if the variation is mismatched with the
actual tra±c °ow|creating pressure points for intervention.
5It is common knowledge that freeway accidents attributed to speed are caused by
variation in speed, not absolute speeds.8 DAVID ZETLAND
Figure 5. View of A Street, north of 3rd, looking south.
Downtown Davis is left. UC Davis is right.
1.5. Past E®orts to Resolve. Past e®orts to resolve the \variation
problem" have included signal synchronization, widening roads, sepa-
rating cars from non-cars (bicycles, pedestrians and non-commuters),
building bypasses and greater use of speed limits and law enforcement.6
Unfortunately, each of these \solutions" has made the situation worse
6\There are widely held misconceptions that speed limit signs will slow the speed
of tra±c, reduce accidents, and increase safety. Most drivers drive at a speed that
they consider being comfortable, regardless of the posted speed limit. 'Before and
after' studies have shown that there are no signi¯cant changes in vehicle speeds
following the posting of new or revised speed limits. Furthermore, research has
found no direct relationship between posted speed limits and accident frequency."
From http://www.city.davis.ca.us/pw/traffic/speedlimit.cfmROUNDABOUTS IN DAVIS 9
because they build in a higher variation between cars and non-cars|
aggravating variation on a di®erent dimension when (inevitably) cars
and non-cars clash.
Curiously, this problem arises from an early notion that cars and
non-cars should be separated for the sake of e±ciency. While it is true
that cars operating at very high speeds are dangerous to non-cars, it
is also true that cars interact with non-cars all the time|especially
at the beginning or end of their trips. Cars and non-cars should not
interact based on car e±ciency but as a balanced system that takes
the needs of all into consideration. This requires a rethink of tra±c
°ow, which roundabouts facilitate. Since roundabouts increase average
speed, drivers are less frustrated and dangerous (Yagil, 2004).
7
1.6. Political Background. Tra±c °ow is dominated by an engineer-
ing perspective of command-and-control e±ciency. Alternative per-
spectives of balance and cooperation (more familiar in biology or soci-
ology) are often dismissed as dangerous or unrealistic; they are merely
unfamiliar (Engwicht, 2005). In addition, drivers common desire to
stay in charge of their environment means that e®orts to \calm" tra±c
represent assaults on their sovereignty (Lehner, 1998). Another barrier
7While \78 percent were satis¯ed with the city's e®ort to coordinate traf-
¯c signals," some residents hate tra±c-calming devices (City of Davis Fi-
nal Budget 2003-4, pp 17-18; see, e.g., http://daviswiki.org/Driving in
DavisTrafficSlowingMeasures). The unhappy 22 percent can cause accidents
through their impatience.10 DAVID ZETLAND
to change is that of path-dependence or status quo, i.e., that entire gen-
erations of engineers, police and drivers would have to learn a di®erent
style of tra±c °ow. This is not true in practice (Engwicht, 2005).
1.7. The Client. The Davis City Council wants to improve the quality
of life in Davis. One area that concerns them is the e®ects of tra±c on
driver satisfaction, resident safety and community livability.
2. Alternatives
In this analysis, I will discuss several alternatives for making inter-
sections (and tra±c °ow in general) work better for cars and non-cars.
Do nothing: This is the baseline scenario to improve and as-
sumes that tra±c signals or signs are optimally con¯gured.
Better Enforcement: Enforcement is not the problem at inter-
sections, as most people obey the tra±c laws that apply. Since
there is no law which states that one must move through the
intersection with the greatest e±ciency, enforcement will not
make tra±c °ow any better. (Technically, it is legal to be in
the intersection when the light turns yellow, so enforcement can-
not improve problems with left turns.) At A and 3rd streets,
enforcement would reduce tra±c °ow, as east- and westbound
bicyclists would stop without need, since there are not always
cars waiting to go northbound. (Dangerous encounters between
bicyclists and cars at this intersection are often caused by the
drivers' desire to go and the bicyclists desire not to stop.) MoreROUNDABOUTS IN DAVIS 11
importantly, the threat of enforcement would have little e®ect
when drivers are impatient after \too much" delay.8
Increase Capacity: The intersections that I am analyzing do
not have space for extra lanes. Even if they did, capacity would
not ¯x the coordination problem at the intersection.
Install Roundabouts: Roundabouts change the way that cars
and non-cars interact at intersections. The resulting balance is
similar to that of an ecosystem: natural balance arising from
simple rules. (Roundabouts are not tra±c circles; the former
are about tra±c control, the latter about calming.9)
8Yagil (2004) reviews the literature on driver psychology. There is controversy over
how drivers actually behave or think with respect to tra±c laws. One assumption
is that tra±c laws contribute to driver safety or that drivers violate them when the
bene¯ts exceed the costs. This assumption does not hold when laws allocate blame,
are banal or encourage rebellious behavior. A far more interesting assumption is
that people obey laws because authority says they should. As far as this analysis is
concerned, we must consider that drivers will break centrally imposed, illegitimate,
or unpopular laws. It is not hard to understand why they hate long waits while
other cars °ow by|this situation violates the primitive premise of fairness (Bros-
nan and Waal, 2003). Well-designed tra±c control decreases unlawful behavior,
reducing cognitive dissonance and increasing respect for other, more useful, forms
of authority.
9Roundabout (Tra±c Circle) Characteristics (Robinson et al., 2000, pp. 8-12):
² Yield control is used on all entries. The circulatory roadway has no control.
(May use stop control, or no control, on one or more entries.)
² Circulating vehicles have the right-of-way. (May require circulating tra±c to
yield to entering tra±c.)
² Pedestrian access is allowed only across the legs of the roundabout, behind
the yield line. (May allow pedestrian access to the central island.)
² No parking is allowed within the circulatory roadway or at the entries. (May
allow parking within the circulatory roadway.)
² All vehicles circulate counter-clockwise and pass to the right of the central
island. (May allow left-turning vehicles to pass to the left of the central
island.)12 DAVID ZETLAND
2.1. Does Davis Need This? In the 1960s, Davis was the ¯rst city
in the United States to paint bike lanes on city streets. It is still praised
for progressive policies:
10
Peter Bejger: What impressed me is that there's a lot
of intelligent urban planning. It's good to see bicycles
¯tting into urban planning.
Michael Cobb: What I also like here [in Davis] is that
there seems to be less of an antagonistic relationship
between bikes and cars like you sometimes see in the
City [San Francisco]. It seems like people here are used
to the bikes and don't have a problem with them.
11
It is ironic that Davis (home of the UCD Institute of Transportation
Studies) uses tra±c-control devices that hinder the quality of life.
12
3. Description and Analysis of the System
3.1. Evaluation Criteria. I will augment bene¯t-cost analysis of the
alternatives with some qualitative information, i.e., by examining:
Tra±c °ow (delay): Measure the mean and variance for travel
time through the intersection.
Driver/Bicyclist/Pedestrian safety: Measure the number and
costs of accidents. Accidents underestimate the cost of safety if
we consider \feelings" of security to be important.
10Davis has statistics to match: \Davis has established itself as `America's Best
Cycling City'(Bicycle Federation of America, 1995). With an area just over ten
square miles, Davis has 48.8 miles of bike lanes and 49 miles of bike paths. More
than 80 percent of all collector and arterial streets within the city have bike lanes
and/or bike paths. This is the highest such ratio of any city in the country! ...With
a population of 55,000 residents, it is estimated there are over 50,000 bikes in the
city of Davis" (Bustos, 2001).
11Bejger and Cobb are members of Di®erent Spokes, a lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender bike club in San Francisco (O'Hara, 2002).
12For the moment, I ignore exceptions such as the bike bridges, three retro-¯tted
roundabouts and the bike-tra±c signal.ROUNDABOUTS IN DAVIS 13
Installation and maintenance costs: Measure initial and an-
nual expenditure.
Quality of life: This qualitative characteristic is hard to quan-
tify. At the moment, I will use my common sense; an ex-
tended version of this analysis would survey commuters and
non-commuters to ¯nd their valuations of various aspects of
each alternative.
13
3.2. Systems Analysis. The primary goal of this section is to relate
exogenous and endogenous variables to each other in a system that
shows how (exogenous, in bold) ¯xed characteristics and (endoge-
nous) choices a®ect each other and how change can alter the equi-
librium. First, I list the variables of interest; second, I show and de-
scribe how they a®ect each other; and third, I show how the alternative
(roundabout) will produce a di®erent result. (In Section 4, I discuss
this thoroughly.)
3.2.1. Variables.
Users: Mean (ADT) and variance of cars, bicycles, and pedestri-
ans, in quantity and speed. Direction of travel (origin and
destination with respect to the intersection). Neighborhood
characteristics (population density, number of children, and
types of transportation) near intersections.
13These valuations might capture feelings about quantitative di®erences as well
as the e®ects of designs on community and personal harmony (Yagil, 2004). See
Engwicht (2005) for a brief discussion of how tra±c and community, drivers and
nondrivers must be treated together as an ecosystem.14 DAVID ZETLAND
Environment: Dimensions of the intersection, natural (build-
ings) and arti¯cial (tra±c control devices) barriers to move-
ment.
Psychological: Legal, social and individual attitudes to-
wards movement in the intersection and towards viola-
tion of others' attitudes.
Economical: Costs to install and operate alternatives. Costs
to users for normal and accidental activities under each alter-
native. Externality costs (pollution, noise, spillovers to other
areas).
3.2.2. Cause-e®ect Relationships. Figure 6 shows the causal relation-
ships between the variables. The most-important relationship is the
feedback of delay, accident and externality costs that result from and
impacts drivers', bicyclists' and pedestrians' use of the intersection. If
those costs are high, they put political pressure for a change of traf-
¯c control device. Neighbors a®ected by externalities can also put on
pressure (no arrow showing this).
3.2.3. Consequences of Alternatives. If the cost of using signals (or stop
sign, if you consider A Street and 3rd), rises too high (in terms of safety,
delay or quality of life), then there will be pressure to ¯nd a solution.
Roundabouts are o®ered as one alternative here, as they have superior
performance with respect to these features. (See Section 4.) Public and
political acceptance will not be a function so much of familiarity but ofROUNDABOUTS IN DAVIS 15
Figure 6. Cause-e®ect relationships between exoge-
nous and endogenous variables, as they interact in the
tra±c control system (either signal or roundabout).16 DAVID ZETLAND
cost and overcoming inertia. Given Davis' proactive stance on tra±c
issues and healthy ¯nances, acceptance will probably depend on believ-
able prospects for improvement. There will be a \breaking in" period
(those single-car accidents) after the discomfort of construction,14 but
this is inevitable and part of the bene¯t-cost analysis.
4. Round Versus Square Interactions at Intersections
According to Francisco (2005), the reasons in favor of a roundabout
are increased safety from a reduced number of broadside accidents. The
reasons against are that roundabouts need more space, large vehicles
have a hard time turning in them, and driver inexperience in using
them.15 They are particularly suitable for intersections with capacity
problems, high accidents (especially left turn) [Richardson and Olive],
four-way stops, or areas with a heavy delay on side streets [A Street and
3rd]. The Federal Highway Administration Roundabout Informational
Guide (Robinson et al., 2000, pp. 24{26) says that \lower circulating
speeds can provide greater operating capacity" and that \roundabouts
eliminate crossing con°icts by converting all movements to right turns."
Lenters and Weber (2004, p. 3) agree. This latter characteristic is one
14This can be minimized by hacking out spaces on the corners before claiming the
middle of the intersection and then making permanent improvements after users
have adjusted to the new scenario.
15He said that the most recent retro¯tted roundabout was at Anderson and Al-
varado; it was to increase the safety of drivers, bicyclists and pedestrians exiting
from side streets across a road with fast tra±c, while increasing tra±c °ow|all at
a lower cost than a \non-warranted" tra±c signal (Pelz and Flecker, 1996).ROUNDABOUTS IN DAVIS 17
reason why drivers, pedestrians, and bicyclists have an easier time in
roundabouts|there's only one place to look.
4.1. Flow. Robinson et al. (2000, p. 62) say that \a roundabout will
always provide a higher capacity and lower delays than an AWSC (All
Way Stop Controlled) intersection operating with the same tra±c vol-
umes and right-of-way limitations." (See Figure 7.) A substantial part
this bene¯t comes during o®-peak periods (Robinson et al., 2000, p.
65). This bene¯t stands when roundabouts are compared with signal-
ized intersections: \A roundabout will provide better operational per-
formance than a signal in terms of stops, delay, fuel consumption, and
pollution emissions...provided the roundabout is operating within its
capacity" (Robinson et al., 2000, pp. 67). Figure 8 applies to Richards
and Olive, which has about 23,000 ADT and ten percent left turns.
Flow e±ciency is the direct result of a more human approach. Com-
mon reminders of failures in signal design are waiting at a red light at
midnight or easing into the intersection on a yellow light to make a left.
Less structure (and information) can lead to more e±cient outcomes
when human randomness is introduced (KlÄ ugl et al., 2003). That is,
fewer restrictions leave responsibility for navigating the intersection to
users; since it is in their best interests to get through the intersection
without hitting each other, they will ¯nd the least cost way appropriate
to the current conditions. (Mechanistic solutions can lead to coordina-
tion problems when following the rules interferes with navigating the
intersection.)18 DAVID ZETLAND
Figure 7. \Roundabout approach delay is relatively in-
sensitive to total major street volume but is sensitive to
the left turn percentage." Average delay per vehicle at
the peak hour signal threshold (Robinson et al., 2000,
Exhibit 3-7 on p. 63).
4.2. Safety. \In comparison to signalized intersections, roundabouts
may experience approximately 33 percent fewer injury crashes in urban
and suburban areas for 20,000 entering ADT" (Robinson et al., 2000,
pp. 60-61). Roundabouts remove many potential areas of con°ict,
between cars (Figure 9) and cars and pedestrians (Figure 10).
In a study of 24 intersections, Persaud et al. (2000) estimated highly
signi¯cant reductions of 39 percent for all crash severities and 76 per-
cent for all injury crashes. (Reductions in the numbers of fatal and
incapacitating injury crashes were estimated to be about 90 percent.)
Neiderhauser et al. (1997, p. 8) agree: \Modern roundabouts have beenROUNDABOUTS IN DAVIS 19
Figure 8. \When the major street approaches domi-
nate, roundabout delay is lower than signal delay, par-
ticularly at the upper volume limit for single lane ap-
proaches and when there is a high proportion of left
turns. [Delay savings for roundabout versus signal, 65
percent volume on major street.]" (Robinson et al., 2000,
Exhibit 3-13 on p. 69).
proven worldwide be the safest form of intersection control." Injury ac-
cidents fell by 34 to 78 percent when intersections were converted to
roundabouts in seven di®erent countries. The intensity of damage in
remaining accidents was also lower|damages fell by about 30 percent
because left-turn accidents were eliminated and angle accidents fell by
80 percent. The only drawback appears to be more single car crashes.
(Apparently drivers fail to go around.)
4.2.1. Bicyclists. In an early study comparing bicycle-car collisions in
Davis (with bike lanes) to Santa Barbara (without bike lanes), Lott20 DAVID ZETLAND
Figure 9. A four-leg single lane roundabout has 75 per-
cent fewer vehicle con°ict points compared to a conven-
tional intersection (Robinson et al., 2000, Exhibit 5-2 on
p. 106).
Figure 10. A comparison of vehicle|pedestrian con-
°icts at signalized and single-lane-roundabout intersec-
tions (Robinson et al., 2000, Exhibits 5-5 and 5-6 on p.
109).
and Lott (1976) ¯nd that bicycle lanes are safer than none for mostROUNDABOUTS IN DAVIS 21
cases, but that there is an increased risk of crash when a cyclist turns
left. Roundabouts are most e®ective at reducing just this type of crash.
Roundabouts can also be safer for bikes because cars' speed in the
roundabout is closer to bike speeds, but bicyclists may be worse o® if
bicyclists cross the paths of drivers. Robinson et al. (2000, p. 120)
note a French study that found bicyclists and pedestrians are involved
in a relatively higher proportion of serious injury accidents [25 per-
cent higher] than they are in other intersections, while personal injury
crashes were twice as likely at signals. In Britain, bicyclists are more
likely to be in a crash at a roundabout then at a signal. Other evi-
dence cautions against hasty conclusions: Figure 11 shows that relative
losses can be swamped by absolute gains. (They had no evidence for
the United States.) European countries have therefore separated bicy-
cles and cars in intersections with high tra±c volumes (more than 8000
ADT).16 \In the Netherlands, a 90 percent decrease in injury crashes
was experienced with separate bicycle paths around roundabouts where
bicyclists do not have the right-of-way crossings". (Robinson et al.,
2000, p. 121)
4.2.2. Pedestrians. Robinson et al. (2000) say that roundabouts pro-
vide superior pedestrian safety compared to intersections with two stop
16For a criticism of separating bikes and cars, see Takemoto-Weerts (1998);
Takemoto-Weerts notes that Davis drivers are often bikers as well, an attribute
that gives us ample hope that further mixing of bikes and cars will not be as bad
as pessimists predict.22 DAVID ZETLAND
Figure 11. Percentage reduction in the number of
crashes by mode at 181 converted Dutch roundabouts
(Robinson et al., 2000, Exhibit 5-16).
signs. The case of four-stop-sign intersections is less clear: pedestri-
ans only have to consider one direction of tra±c at a time and cars
are physically slowed down by roundabouts, but roundabouts require
more pedestrian judgment and caution when crossing against tra±c
°ow, when merging drivers will be looking left instead of right. Blind
pedestrians need special consideration (and are likely to get it).
4.3. Operational Expenses and Implementation. Compared to
signals, roundabouts have lower maintenance costs, higher retro¯t in-
stallation costs and similar green¯eld installation costs (Lenters and
Weber, 2004; Neiderhauser et al., 1997, p. 8).
Roundabouts may not work in certain locations. (See Figure 12.)
Physical or geometric complications, bottlenecks which back tra±c into
the roundabout, unfavorable topography which may limit visibility, and
heavy pedestrian or bicycle movements may not prohibit a roundabout,
but they must be taken into consideration (Robinson et al., 2000, pp.
54-55).ROUNDABOUTS IN DAVIS 23
Figure 12. Di®erent roundabouts are suitable for dif-
ferent locations, given physical constraints and tra±c
°ows (Robinson et al., 2000, Exhibit 1-7). A Street at
3rd has a 20 m diagonal. Richards Boulevard and Olive
Drive have a 30{50 m diagonal, depending on how conser-
vative you are with right-of-way. (There are large open
spaces on a three out of four corners of the intersection.)
Each of these intersections could contain a roundabout
with some judicious compromises.
4.4. Satisfaction. Most drivers prefer a steady speed to an average
speed that combines slow and fast speeds, e.g., stop and go tra±c.17 In
economics, we use this preference to characterize risk aversion, i.e., that
you prefer to consistently have the average payo® from a gamble instead
of having to win and lose to achieve that payo®. In other words, people
prefer low variation over high variation for a given average result. The
17Burris (2003) agrees with this, citing the number of people killed each year run-
ning red lights. He documents that drivers over-report the amount of time they are
delayed in tra±c (compared to reality, a similar ¯nding to that of Berrens et al.
(2004)). Overall, a majority of drivers are willing to pay something (especially if
they are either rich or poor) to avoid \getting stuck" at an intersection.24 DAVID ZETLAND
intrinsic nature of a roundabout (steady, slower speeds) means that
it can deliver more satisfactory results than an intersection, holding
average speed constant.
Lenters and Weber (2004, p. 3) \Roundabouts are also generally
preferred when considering less-quanti¯able criteria such as the needs
of vulnerable road users, environmental impacts from noise, fuel con-
sumption and vehicle emissions, and aesthetics."
Public acceptance of roundabouts has often been found the one of
the biggest challenges facing a jurisdiction that is planning to install
its ¯rst roundabout. Public attitude towards roundabouts improve
signi¯cantly after construction (Robinson et al., 2000, p. 40).
4.5. Community. One bene¯t of a roundabout at A Street and 3rd is
that cars and pedestrians would cooperate more. A stop sign informs
drivers that they need only stop before accelerating; a roundabout
integrates them into the community|for the good of all (Engwicht,
2005; FHWA, 1994).
Lehner (1998) reports in a survey of drivers and pedestrians in Eu-
rope that pedestrians prefer that drivers be restricted while drivers
prefer to be in charge. Both drivers and pedestrians agree the drivers
speed to save time or because they are in a hurry, but drivers are alone
in saying that they speed \because there is little tra±c." (A re°ection
of di®erent attitudes towards a roads qua dividers or uni¯ers of points
of interest.) Roundabouts reduce speeds while allowing drivers to stay
in charge.ROUNDABOUTS IN DAVIS 25
Redmon (2003) reports that pedestrians feared being hit by cars
while drivers fear law-enforcement. Drivers said \they did not want
to hurt pedestrians, but they also did not want them in their way"
[p 28]. While this report suggests that driver/pedestrian interaction
needs to improve, the author, a transportation specialist in the Federal
Highway Administration's safety o±ce, suggests greater awareness and
enforcement of laws. This solution is no surprise, coming from someone
whose job is command-and-control, but the fact is the drivers rarely
pay attention to posted signs (Francisco, 2005). A more productive
route may be to make them think more, not less, about their relation-
ship to pedestrians (e.g., as Monderman suggests in Lyall (2005). See
also Appendix|\Livable Streets."). As many psychologists have sug-
gested (e.g., Axelrod and Hamilton (1981); Berg et al. (1995); Fehr and
Fischbacher (2002); Fehr and Schmidt (1999)), community feelings are
not hard to invoke|they underly millennia of social cooperation.
5. Evaluating The Consequences of Alternatives
To evaluate the alternatives, I reviewed (some of) the extensive liter-
ature on roundabouts, congestion, and driver attitudes; gathered sta-
tistical information on my two intersections; and spoke with a City of
Davis Tra±c Planner to understand current thinking in their depart-
ment.26 DAVID ZETLAND
Accounting Stance: Residents and commuters in the city of
Davis. (Tra±c-control is a local matter. Although there are
federal standards for tra±c control symbols.)
Bene¯ts: As discussed in Section 3.1, bene¯ts are measured in
tra±c °ow (delay), safety, and quality of life.
Costs: Installation and operating costs are quanti¯able.
Justi¯cation: Tra±c-control is often analyzed using bene¯t-cost
analysis. For the sake of comparison, I will continue in that
tradition, but I will also examine the qualitative di®erences be-
tween the alternatives, as their signi¯cant impact may change
the eventual recommended action.18
Sensitivity Analysis: The most obvious target for sensitivity
analysis is the impact on safety. Some say that safety is not
quanti¯able per se.19 For this reason, I will measure safety in
nominal (absolute numbers) and converted (monetary) terms.
As shown in Table 3, Roundabouts have an annual advantage of
$267,000. This must be compared to the operations disadvantage (over
18For a long time, quality-of-life and e±ciency of tra±c °ow were separated in
people's minds, but \radicals" such as Engwicht and Monderman have brought
them together in one debate called \living in a community." Both are advocates of
reintegrating drivers into the space they traverse and building interaction between
drivers, pedestrians, bicyclists and residents to restore the social fabric that gives
life meaning.
19Hauer (1994) questions whether or not life can be valued at all in cost-bene¯t
analysis. If an increased tra±c °ow (decreased delay) leads to more fatalities,
can we actually balance cost to bene¯t? Tra±c calming, including roundabouts,
slows down tra±c, increases safety and reduces e±ciency, but it also contributes to
qualitative improvements in life when the car shares the road with bicyclists and
pedestrians. These qualitative improvements are often omitted from cost-bene¯t
analysis\because bureaucracies, professions and professionals have a vital interest
and continued acceptance of decision by computation" (Hauer, 1994, p 115).ROUNDABOUTS IN DAVIS 27
Table 3. Construction cost for the signal is zero in the
¯rst year, since it is already in place. The $350,000 con-
struction cost may be high; signalization in Davis cost
$180,000 in 1996 (Pelz and Flecker, 1996). Richards
Blvd/Olive Drive accident statistics for 2000-2004 (DPD,
2005). 100% accident reduction is from the literature;
25% reduction/increase is my interpretation of the liter-
ature. \Other" includes bicycle, object and single-vehicle
accidents. I assume bicycle accidents cost $80,000/each
(1996 dollars) and object/single-vehicle accidents cost
$20,000/each. Other rises because I assume (conserva-
tively) that the roundabout makes no provision for bi-
cycle/car separation. Delay savings use 5,000/vehicle-
hrs/year at $10/hr from Figure 8.
Signal Roundabout
Quantitative Di®erences
Operations
Construction Cost $100,000 $350,000
Maintenance Cost $6,500 $1,000
Project Life 10 years 25 years
Total Cost (NPV, 5%) $176,000 $364,000
Di®erence (25 Year base) +$188,000
Accidents
Rear-Ender 5 3.75 (-25%)
Broadside/Head-on 1.6 0 (-100%)
Other 2 2.5 (+25%)
Accident Costs
Rear-Ender $370,000 $277,500
Broadside/Head-on $149,600 $0
Other $100,000 $125,000
Total Cost (annual, PV) $619,600 $402,500
Annual Di®erence +$217,100
Annual Delay Savings $0 ($50,000)
Qualitative Di®erences
Speed|Mean { +
Speed|Variance { +
Inclusion { +
Security { +28 DAVID ZETLAND
a total of 25-years) of $188,000 in current dollars. Thus, a roundabout
at Richards and Olive would have roughly a 35:1 advantage over the
current signal. If we include the qualitative advantages, a roundabout
looks even better.20
The case for A Street at 3rd is more subtle. Since there are very
few accidents at this intersection right now, (two in the last ¯ve years
with no injuries, according to DPD (2005).) a case must be made for
other bene¯ts, which can be measured against smaller costs (since a
mini-roundabout costs about $10,000 to install).21 Currently, bicyclists
ignore the stop sign at this intersection and cars wait as long as bikes
are passing before leaving (e®ectively a yield sign). There are, however,
many instances of \coordination problems" where a bike and car will
simultaneously go, thinking that the other is going to stop. This prob-
lem results in many near collisions and can be addressed with a mini
roundabout (between ¯ve and ten meters in diameter, the intersection
diagonal is about 20 m.), which would improve users' satisfaction.
6. Uncertainty and Risk
6.1. Major Sources of Uncertainty.
20These numbers may seem overly-optimistic. Doubling the construction cost to
$700,000 may reduce them to a 17:1 advantage. Accident costs are likely to be
understated; they are in 1996 dollars from a study of accidents that took place be-
tween 1990-93 in Maryland, which may have a lower population/capita of personal
injury lawyers.
21In 1996, they cost about $6,000 in Seattle (FHWA, 1994). The temporary round-
about installed at Alvarado and Anderson cost $18,000; The permanent con¯gura-
tion was $40,000 (Pelz and Flecker, 1996).ROUNDABOUTS IN DAVIS 29
² Driver reactions to roundabouts are sometimes a surprise, ei-
ther good or bad. FHWA (1994, p. 52) reports that businesses,
media and policy makers often underestimate public support for
tra±c-calming; this evidence should be used to counter overly-
pessimistic reactions from policy-makers that roundabouts won't
work.
² Safety may not materialize as soon as expected or according
the averages. A fatality from a disoriented driver at a new
roundabout could kill public support.
² The network e®ects of altering tra±c °ow are sometimes uncer-
tain. In my 212B presentation, someone mentioned that tra±c
may backup from the stoplight at Richards and 1st Street. This
would halt movement in the roundabout. There are two solu-
tions to this: install another roundabout at Richards and 1st
Street or put a signal south of the roundabout that prevents
northbound tra±c from entering the roundabout if the tra±c
backs up.
² It may be impossible to buy the right-of-way from land-owners
at the corners of any roundabout location. This can stop the
project|unless bribery or eminent domain changed the out-
come.30 DAVID ZETLAND
6.2. How Alternatives Change Risk. My single feasible alterna-
tive (roundabouts) reduces the risk of passing through an intersec-
tion. Lower average speeds give everyone more time to react and in-
teract. The design also creates a necessity of interacting with other
roundabout-goers, increasing the risk of actual eye-to-eye (not bumper)
contact. The risk for those unfamiliar with roundabouts is negative,
but this risk is not much di®erent from any new situation. People
manage to jay-walk all over the place (blind people may be one ex-
ception, but they are likely to be assisted or accommodated across the
intersection). There is a risk that people will not behave respectably
in the intersection, but I have faith that they will be nice. (So do Ax-
elrod and Hamilton (1981); Berg et al. (1995); Cummins (2004); Eng-
wicht (2005); Fehr and Fischbacher (2002); Fehr and Schmidt (1999);
Leikanger (2005); Lyall (2005).)
7. Recommendation
I recommend that the Davis City Council proceed to investigate the
feasibility of converting Richards Boulevard and Olive (A Street and
3rd) from signal (stop sign) to urban-single-lane (mini) roundabout.
8. Further Research
To strengthen my problem de¯nition, systems description and multi-
criteria analysis, I need to do the following:ROUNDABOUTS IN DAVIS 31
(1) Survey Davis commuters, residents, and police on their atti-
tudes towards the subject intersections.
(2) Update statistics (ADT, accident costs, etc.).
(3) Discuss the technical/engineering potential of change at the two
intersections. Get cost (time and money) estimates for change.
(4) Discuss the political potential for change with the City Council
(and UC administration, at A and 3rd).32 DAVID ZETLAND
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Appendix: Livable Streets
His challenge to rational tra±c planning principles? Re-
move the signs and tra±c-control lights. That is lateral
thinking of the highest order. No wonder he was laughed
at for a long time. That always happens whenever some-
one challenges an established, basic assumption. This is
that basic assumption: Cars are made to move people
from A to B|their quick and e±cient movement has
priority|signs and tra±c controls and multi-lane roads
ensure the quick and e±cient movement of cars.
However, Monderman wasn't seeing quick and e±-
cient motion, he was seeing stop/go/slow-down/speed-
up/stop.
Think of whenever you've stopped for a red light, in
the middle of the night, in a city. No cars in front of you,
no cars behind, no cars to either side of you. And you're
drumming away time as you are waiting for the light
to change from red to green. Monderman was seeing
variations of that all day: enforced pauses where there
was no need for them. He posited that congestion, tra±c
jams and rush-hour could be alleviated if not eliminated
by taking away enforced °ow-control. He also stated
that tra±c should be slowed down, in order to have it
be able to move quicker. (Another wonderful lateral
insight). The trouble was that tra±c was moving so
fast that people didn't dare interact with cars unless
the river of cars was stopped by a red light. By slowing
down tra±c, cars and pedestrians could interact.
Leave the control to the people using the roads, he
said, both drivers and pedestrians. They'll know what
to do, they'll be able to sort out their priorities e±-
ciently. The present system where management results
from laws, regulations and police supervision has people
disassociating themselves from what is happening out-
side the car, and leads to drivers not seeing the people
they are driving past. By removing the regulatory cues,
signs and controls, drivers are reminded that they are
part of the environment they are in, and not just passing
through. Monderman wanted to manipulate the lay-out
of roads, the surrounding architecture and the width of36 DAVID ZETLAND
roads, to regulate speed where slower speeds were re-
quired.
Monderman was told he was crazy, and that his ideas
would increase tra±c accidents between people and cars.
But he was allowed to conduct a few trials, in the Nether-
lands. The results have revolutionized tra±c control,
and have also reduced tra±c fatalities signi¯cantly.
(Leikanger, 2005)
Monderman's \sign free" intersections are similar to those in Davis
(20,000 ADT). Although the United States is di®erent from the Nether-
lands in many respects, Davis should be able to handle the complexities
of an \interactive" intersection. As Monderman says,\They are treat-
ing you like your complete idiot, and if people treat you like a complete
idiot, you will act like one" (Lyall, 2005).
For more on livable communities where cars and people cooperate,
see Engwicht (2003).